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Abstract— Trust and risk are often seen in proportion to each 
other; as such high trust may induce low risk and vise versa. 
However, recent research argues that trust and risk 
relationship is implicit rather than proportional. Considering 
that trust and risk are implicit, this paper proposes for the first 
time a novel approach to view trust and risk on a basis of a 
provenance data model (W3C PROV) applied in a healthcare 
domain. We argue that high trust in healthcare domain can be 
placed in data despite of its high risk, and low trust data can 
have low risk depending on data quality attributes and its 
provenance. This is demonstrated by our trust and risk models 
applied to the Brain Injury Index (BII) case study data. The 
proposed theoretical approach first calculates risk values at 
each workflow step considering PROV concepts and second, 
aggregates the final risk score for the whole provenance chain. 
Different from risk model, trust of a workflow is derived by 
applying Dempster–Shafer Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(DS/AHP) method. The results prove our assumption that trust 
and risk relationship is implicit. 
Keywords- trust; risk model; provenance; decision support; 
workflow; DS/AHP; 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, business critical decisions heavily rely on 
data collected and manipulated by many distributed sources 
and services. To make sure that crucial, high value decisions 
will not put business at risk, it becomes important to put trust 
in information and system data outputs. Trust is one of the 
concepts that is used to verify the usefulness and/or 
criticality of data, systems, personnel and whole workflow. 
However, it is quite challenging to define the term because it 
is being used with a variety of meanings and in many 
different contexts, sociology, psychology, and philosophy. 
The common notions of trust are associated with hope, faith, 
belief, confidence reliance on the integrity, dependence or 
character of a person or thing [10]. The variety of common 
terms shows that there is no precise definition of trust as it 
largely depends on author’s viewpoint. Trust is also often 
situation specific; in one environment trust does not directly 
transfer to another environment and the notion of context is 
necessary [10]. Recent research inherently links trust to risk. 
There is no reason to trust if there is no risk involved. Thus, 
the cooperation or interaction with the system or human is 
less likely with higher risk unless the benefits from such 
interaction are worth the risk. The SECURE project has 
made a good attempt in demonstrating that risk and trust are 
inexorably linked and must both be considered when making 
a decision about some ambiguity whose outcome depends on 
another entity’s action [10]. Also, considering observations 
made by [2] where authors see that trust is generally neither 
proportional nor inverse proportional to risk under various 
constraints, in this paper we put a first attempt to 
demonstrate how trust and risk relationship can enhance 
trustworthiness in systems and inform decisions.  Inspired by 
the challenge of relating trust while considering 
consequences of risk, the trusted digital Spaces through 
Timely Reliable And Personalised Provenance (STRAPP) 
project aims to provide an approach to enable users make 
informative decisions by considering three notions associated 
with the data: risk, provenance and trust. To demonstrate the 
STRAPP view of trust and risk relationship we use W3C 
PROV Data model [11] for provenance interchange. This 
data model describes entities, activities and people involved 
in the creation of data, its operation and decision making. It 
allows the decision maker to see the chain of activities, 
processes and data inputs as well as agents who performed 
certain actions with regard to data.  The aim of the paper is to 
address an assumption that trust in system can be placed 
knowing the data source and its quality, and risk associated 
with some processes may be high despite of good quality 
data used. We model risk and trust independently on a basis 
of a same workflow generated using BII case study data. 
Under STRAPP context, we define risk as a “probability of 
some unwanted events at every workflow process which may 
result in unwanted consequences to this process”, whereas 
trust is assessed in the context of data quality of a particular 
data file, and defined as “a degree of confidence placed in 
input data while considering data quality attributes: 
completeness, accuracy, relevance, of the data file." Data file 
in the BII case study consists of several metadata input fields 
that are assessed in terms of their quality and importance. 
The ranking of input files is performed by applying  
DS/AHP.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: 
Section II gives an overview of the STRAPP project 
highlighting its aims and applicability to the BII case study. 
Section III provides the most relevant work in three research 
areas: trust, risk and provenance and tries to highlight how 
these fields can facilitate decision making process. Section 
IV discusses BII case study as well as presents risk and trust 
models on a workflow basis. Section V summarises the 
results, work accomplished and provides future research 
directions. 
 
II. STRAPP OVERVIEW 
The STRAPP project has been established, funded by 
Rolls-Royce, Cybula Ltd, and the UK Technology Strategy 
Board to facilitate the assessment of provenance-based, 
personalised trusted digital spaces where timely and critical 
decisions should be made. The objective of STRAPP is to 
enable users to place increased trust on data shown by, and 
decisions made by a system and by allowing them to view 
the provenance of that data or decision, presented in a 
personalised manner (for example, based on their role; 
managers may need to view the provenance and risk of a 
decision at a different level than software engineers, etc.) 
Furthermore, the project aims to provide visualization 
mechanisms to ensure users understand trust and the risks 
associated with data and decision-making. In the short term, 
these mechanisms are integrated to both the Equipment 
Health Management (EHM) system developed by OSyS - a 
subsidiary company of Rolls-Royce PLC - that provides 
customers (primarily in the aerospace, marine and energy 
sectors) with the ability to diagnose and predict equipment 
faults, and to the Brain Injury Index (BII) system developed 
by Cybula Ltd that assists researchers and practitioners in the 
healthcare industry, with a focus on neuroscience. In the 
longer-term, it is hoped that many other decision-support 
systems in a wide range of sectors will be able to take 
advantage of the STRAPP system. 
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the trust 
and risk assessment components modelled using BII case 
study data. The purpose is to demonstrate the implicit 
relationship between trust and risk, as discussed in works 
[10] [2] and visualise this relationship on a workflow basis.  
III. RELATED WORK 
Our research encompasses several research directions: 
trust assessment and modelling, risk analysis and its 
conceptual relation to trust, provenance modelling and its 
usability with regard to decision making process. Therefore, 
in this paper we will focus on trust and risk modelling on a 
basis of provenance data to make an attempt of 
demonstrating the implicit relationship between risk and 
trust as it was observed in papers [2] [10] under specific use 
case. 
Trust is a widely explored topic within a variety of 
computer science domains. Trust is defined as a relationship 
between two entities, a trustor and a trustee where a trustor 
places some level of trust in a trustee under a specific set of 
contexts.  Thus, trust in literature is used in a variety of 
meanings.  A distinction between context independent trust 
(reliability trust) and context dependent trust (decision trust) 
can often be recognized among scientific community, 
although usually not explicitly expressed [4]. Reliability 
trust is interpreted as the reliability of something or 
somebody independent of the context. As such, according to 
Gambetta [1] trust is a particular level of the subjective 
probability with which “an agent assesses that another 
agent or group of agents will perform particular action, 
both before he can monitor such action and in the context in 
which it affects his own action.” It is a crucial question then, 
whether or not to engage in cooperation with an agent. This 
cooperation depends on the extent to which the agent 
(trustor) believes that the trustee will behave in a certain 
way. Hence, the level of trust is determined subjectively 
based on evidences available to the trustor on trustree’s 
behaviour and constraints by which this behaviour might be 
regulated.  
Decision trust, when seen within a context, is defined as 
the extent to which a given party is willing to depend on 
something or somebody in a given situation with a feeling of 
relative security, even though negative consequences are 
possible [4]. This definition implicitly covers contextual 
elements, such as possible outcomes, environmental factors 
(existing safety/security mechanisms) and risk attitude 
(taking, avoiding, and transferring). The authors in [5] draw 
a model of trust composed of a reliability trust as the 
probability of a transaction success and a decision trust 
derived from a decision surface. With such example, authors 
provide a first attempt to shape the relationship between risk 
and trust. The model first, calculates expected gain of a 
possible transaction and second, introduces a fraction of the 
capital the agent is willing to risk. Risk as part of the model 
is taken in order to derive a more complete definition of 
trust, the decision trust. Therefore, the approach of including 
risk  into the model provides more meaningful notion of 
trust because it combines trust with risk attitudes.  
Recently, trust is modelled by highlighting the presence 
and importance of provenance data. The semantic 
representation of trust and provenance data is modelled 
through the provenance ontology.  As such, authors in [6] 
present a trust model for the measurement of trust value in 
the context of smart cities. Trust value is calculated 
according to each factor independently. The factors 
calculated are defined as trust of authority, popularity, 
recommendation, provenance, timeliness and geographical 
distance.  Another method for assessing trust based on 
provenance information is presented in [7]. The authors 
proposed an assessment method which calculates trust 
values based on timeliness of data quality.  In [8], trust is 
assessed by first computing reputation-based trust value and 
second, trust values are computed based on provenance 
information, represented by means of W3C standard PROV 
model. By merging trust values authors claim that it can be 
beneficial for reliability of the estimated trust value. In trust 
management domain, reputation is used to define trust 
between two agents. Reputation is what generally said or 
believed about a person’s or thing’s character or standing 
[4]. It influences trust in two ways: firstly, it positively 
affects the trustor’s reliability trust in the trustee and 
secondly, it disciplines the trustee as it is known that bad 
behavior will be seen. The good example of difference 
between trust and reputation can be seen in the following 
statements: (1) I trust because of its good reputation (2) I 
trust despite of its bad reputation. Statement 1 states that 
trust is placed based on reputation, while statement 2 
reflects that a relying party has some extra knowledge about 
a party to trust, e.g., through direct experience or 
relationship that can overrule any positive or negative 
reputation. A fuzzy model for calculating trust based on a 
workflow was proposed in [9]. Authors argue that 
provenance provides a useful way to capture information 
and to be used to evaluate trust and fuzzy rules enable 
greater degree of flexibility in assessing provenance 
information.  
There are many forms and variations of risk and trust 
analysis, depending on the application domain, such as 
health care, finance, reliability and safety, IT security. In 
finance, risk analysis is concerned with balancing potential 
gain against risk of investment loss. In this setting risk can 
be both positive and negative. Within reliability, safety and 
IT security risk analysis is concerned with protecting 
existing infrastructure and assets. This paper focuses on 
analysing risk and trust of a health care system under 
specific use case. We are aiming to demonstrate that risk 
and trust are not necessarily proportional [2], but have an 
impersonal relation [3] and fulfill each other. In safety 
critical and health care systems, it is often stated that trust is 
better understood in terms of cost/benefit analysis and 
calculated risks, as well as by knowing provenance 
information. Therefore, in a situation when users should 
make critical decisions they users should be aware of 
possible outcomes and their probabilities, risks to be taken 
and uncertainties involved in the analysis as well as 
provenance of information.  
As it can be seen the research on trust often highlights 
importance of provenance. Moreover, the way trust is 
modelled depends on perspective of the domain and trust 
definition. We base our research on the assumption that trust 
can be enhanced knowing the quality of data and its 
provenance. Also, we make an assumption that knowing 
data related risks and their scale can improve the knowledge 
of a system, its processes and most critical data-related 
activities. In overall, knowing how data was processed, 
derived, operated, agents involved as well as associated trust 
and risk values provided at each stage of data processing  
 
IV. BII CASE STUDY 
A neuroscience researcher wants to choose a set of data 
files on which to validate a new analysis technique. They 
use the BII portal to select files for appropriate patients, but 
want to be able to choose a subset of these files which 
represent the data which is the most trustworthy. For any 
given file, the researcher wants to see a summary which 
helps them understand to what extent they can trust the data 
and what is the level of  risk associated with this data. 
All files on the BII portal have associated metadata. If the 
metadata is not present, the data should be deemed to be less 
trustworthy. However, it will not necessarily mean the data 
is more risky, as the risk is associated with other parameters, 
such as threats of agent’s failure, wrong data export settings 
and/or various bugs in software agents.  
 
A. Provenance-Based Risk Model of a Domain Based 
Workflow 
In order to assess risk associated with making critical, 
high-value health decisions based on evidence presented by 
a system, it is essential to know how the data was derived, 
processed and transformed. For this purpose, we build on a 
workflow generated and associated provenance meta-data 
which is unique for each system under observation and 
contains the linking between system personnel, processes 
and documents along with configuration management 
information as a connected directed graph. The provenance 
modeling builds upon the W3C’s de-facto ontological 
representation of PROV named PROV-O which is defined 
using the W3C’s Web Ontology Language (OWL2). The 
provenance data consists of a list of entities from the 
workflow graph as well as provenance specific meta-data: 
software version, training data for software systems, 
personnel associated with system processes.  Within 
STRAPP, we apply a quantitative risk assessment approach 
to estimate the level of risk possessed by the provenance 
data recorded within the PROV data model. Therefore, an 
identification of the elements of risk within the provenance 
chain becomes important. It should be noted, that the nature 
of risks may differ thus, the quantitative risk estimation too. 
In order for a risk model to be applied to the BII use 
case, STRAPP first is used to generate a provenance chain. 
Based on a provenance chain risk model can be applied and 
relevant queries are made. As such, STRAPP performs a 
number of queries to the target system, where risk data is 
stored and dynamically monitored. Table 1 shows risk 
attributes generated by the BII system and risk matching 
combinations. A Domain expert usually is responsible for 
estimating the probability of such combinations and their 
impact. These data is then passed to STRAPP, which 
performs necessary calculations and risk aggregation as well 
as presents risk output on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is low 
risk and 7 is considered as high. Risk is calculated based on 
an Activity_ID, Entity used by and Agent associated with 
this Activity_ID. Fig. 1 demonstrates an output from 
STRAPP system based on BII use case data. The workflow 
demonstrates a chain of processes starting from its initial 
data source (Patient) and finishing by an Entity “Diagnosis” 
made to the patient.  
Threats and vulnerabilities shown in Table I are specific 
to the activities, entities and agents involved in the chain. 
The list can change depending upon the domain. Risks in 
BII domain are clearly associated with data completeness, 
relevance, accuracy (e.g., V2, V3, V4, V5 etc.).  
TABLE I.  RISK COMBINATIONS 
Vulnerability (Vi) Threat 
 (Tj) 
Matching 
Combinations  
Poor signal quality 
(V1) 
Electrical Interference 
(T1) 
V1T1, V1T3, 
V1T4 
Incomplete Data (V2) Software Agent 
Failure (T2) 
V2T2, V2T8 
Inaccurate values 
(V3) 
Incorrect Calibration 
(T3) 
V3T3 
Incorrect data 
exported (V4) 
Poor Electrode 
Contact (T4) 
V4T5, V4T6, 
V4T7 
Malfunction in a 
training model (V5) 
Software agent Export 
failure (T5) 
V5T5 
Incorrect data set 
(V6) 
Incorrectly labelled 
units (T6) 
V6T6 
Data set conversion 
failure (V7) 
Wrong Export 
Settings (T7) 
V7T10 
Undetected event 
(V8) 
Human agent error 
(T8) 
V8T12, V8T6, 
V8T12 
Detection routine 
failure (V9) 
Human agent 
malicious intent (T9) 
V9T11 
Incorrect parameters 
chosen (V10) 
Bug in conversion 
software (T10) 
V10T6,  
 Bug in detection 
software (T11) 
 
 Unseen event type 
(T12) 
 
 
From Fig.1, risk is calculated per block. The block is 
defined in terms of an entity, activity and associated agent:                          ; 
where               is risk of an entity, activity and agent 
respectively.  
STRAPP is querying target system for an activity ID and 
string of risks with regard to this activity. The system 
should respond with a string of risks of an entity, activity 
and agent:           = {R1…Rn }; Risk for an agent is defined in terms of agents’ years of 
experience and assigned a factor from a scale of 0 to 1, 
where 1 is very experienced (e.g., more than 10 years 
experience, and 0 – no experience at all). As such, risk for 
an agent can be scaled as follows:     ϵ [0.33, 0.66, 0.99] ; 
Risk per block is aggregated as follows:                                ; 
 
Overall aggregated risk of a chain under analysis is 
calculated as follows: 
         ቀ            ቁ  ቀ            ቁ                 
 
 
Figure 1 Risk output 
 
Activity “Make Diagnosis” and agent “Clinician” has 
got high risk level. This is because agent’s risk is defined in 
terms of its years of experience. Therefore, inexperienced 
clinician could make an incorrect diagnosis and result in a 
high aggregated workflow risk. More years of experience 
would dramatically reduce the overall risk of a final 
“Diagnosis”. 
B. Provenance-Based Trust of a Domain Based Workflow 
 
Our trust model is concerned with the ranking of 
decision alternatives over a number of attributes. Based on a 
case study data, some of the attributes can be incomplete. 
There are numerous methods to aid decision makers solve 
multi-attribute decision making (MADM) problems with 
incomplete information, amongst these methods the analytic 
hierarchy process (AHP) has been widely used, originally 
proposed by Saaty [13].  
Our trust algorithm first identifies all possible focal 
elements from incomplete decision matrix, then it calculates 
the basic probability assignment (bpa) of each focal 
element. Second, belief interval of each decision alternative 
is evaluated according Dempster-Shafer theory (DS). Third, 
applying ranking method decision alternatives are 
determined by comparing their belief intervals. More details 
on DS/AHP and its application can be found in [14]. 
The following metadata fields contribute to the trust 
decision matrix: 
 
 
 
TABLE II.  TRUST METADATA 
 
 
Data on the BII portal contains provenance information 
about the services which were used to generate it, and the 
inputs to those services. This information is crucial in the 
determination of the level of trust which can be placed in the 
data. The following pieces of information are pertinent to 
the initial trust model, and will apply to all pieces of 
data/services in the provenance chain: 
TABLE III.  DATA PROVENANCE/SERVICE INFORMATION 
 
Some data, after analysis, will have some results 
associated with it, such as event detections. As part of this 
analysis, some measures may be available which would help 
determine the trustworthiness of the data. Initially these are 
limited, but could be increased in future: 
TABLE IV.  DATA  
 
Fig.2 shows the trust levels derived by applying 
DS/AHP to input data shown in Tables II, III, IV. For every 
PROV element trust level is estimated taking as an input a 
set of files with relevant data entries and applying DS/AHP 
algorithm the ranking is performed. As such, we have 
applied DS/AHP to rank the trust level at the source:  Entity 
“Patient”. 
 
Figure 2 Trust output 
 
The input to DS/AHP consists of 10 files, each with 8 
data fields. As it can be seen from Table V some of these 
fields are missing. Data fields such as patient_ID, center, 
sensor fitted by, administrator, data channels, recording 
frequency, and recording setup are treated equally, without 
emphasizing on importance. After running DS/AHP, it was 
derived that some of the files have low trust, e.g., 
“sample.ps”. This is because most of the data fields are 
empty, missing or incomplete. Medium trust files have 
several empty fields. In the same manner, the set of data 
files relevant to activities within a workflow can be analysed 
and ranked according to DS/AHP. The user of a system can 
then see at what stage data might get lost, corrupted or 
tempered with. Therefore, somebody knowing such 
situation would be interested in knowing possible 
consequences or risks associated with the decision trust.  
Risk and trust can be seen implicitly. As such, we have 
demonstrated risk view on a basis of a workflow taking as 
an input risks relevant to data completeness, accuracy, 
relevance. It was seen that high risk activities may also 
result in high trust, if the data is of a high quality. As such, 
we can compare risk and trust of an activity “Apply Filters” 
from Fig.1 and Fig2. In terms of risk – “Apply Filters”  risk 
level is 5 (out of 7) and trust is high. Risk was calculated 
knowing that a number of threats and vulnerabilities are 
present and may harm the data quality of an Adibin data set.  
However, trust algorithm when applied on this activity has 
shown high trust in data set, as most of the data fields were 
complete. Therefore, we have made an assumption, that 
knowing that trust level in data is high does not necessarily 
mean it has low risk. Risk in our context is more associated 
with external factors which are not considered by the trust 
algorithm, e.g., software bug, software agent export failure. 
 
TABLE V.  TRUST DECISION MATRIX RANKING RESULTS 
V. CONCLUSION 
Considering that trust and risk are implicit, this paper 
proposes for the first time a novel approach to view trust 
and risk on a basis of a W3C PROV provenance data model 
applied in the healthcare domain. We have made an 
assumption that high trust in data does not necessarily mean 
low risk, as these factors fulfill each other rather than can be 
seen independently. This is demonstrated by our trust and 
risk models applied to the Brain Injury Index (BII) case 
study data. We first, present the risk model, which first 
calculates risk values at each workflow step considering 
PROV concepts and second, aggregates the final risk score 
for the whole provenance chain. Different from risk model, 
trust of a workflow is derived by applying DS/AHP method. 
In situation when user should make a critical decision, users 
should be aware of possible outcomes and their 
probabilities, risks to be taken and uncertainties involved in 
the analysis as well as provenance of information. The 
system is trustworthy when these aspects are open to the 
system user. The evaluation of such system will be 
performed under the STRAPP context in the medical 
domain. We make a hypothesis that if user is aware of risks 
and trust levels involved in the PROV chain the 
trustworthiness in a system can be improved. Therefore, 
more analysis needs to be done in the area of risk and trust. 
Nevertheless, our first attempt of visualizing risk and trust 
concepts on a workflow basis and making a relational 
comparison of derived results proved our assumption that 
risk and trust are implicit, not proportional.  
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